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Abstract — The cloud computing model 
transforming the IT landscape. Cloud computing is a new 
computing paradigm that delivers computing resources as 
a set of reliable and scalable internet
allowing customers to remotely run and manage these 
services. Infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) is one of the 
popular cloud computing services. IaaS allows customers 
to increase their computing resources on the fly without 
investing in new hardware. IaaS adapts virtualization to 
enable on-demand access to a pool of virtual computing 
resources. Although there are great benefits 
from cloud computing, cloud computing 
categories of threats to be introduced. These threats are a 
result of the cloud virtual infrastructure complexity 
created by the adoption of the virtualization technology.
Breaching the security of any component in the cloud 
virtual infrastructure significantly impacts on the security 
of other components and consequently affects the overall 
system security. This paper explores the security problem 
of the cloud platform virtual infrastructure 
existing security threats and the complexities of this 
virtual infrastructure. The paper also discusses the 
existing security approaches to secure the cloud virtual 
infrastructure and their drawbacks. Fin
and explore some key research challenges of implementing 
new virtualization-aware security solutions that can 
provide the pre-emptive protection for complex and ever
dynamic cloud virtual infrastructure. 
Keyword —: cloud computing, cloud virtual infrastructure 
security, virtualization security 
 
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud Computing [1, 2] is a new computing paradigm 
in which the Internet is used to deliver reliable 
services to customers. The amount of that service can 
be scaled up and down based on customer needs
flexibility, combined with the potential of a 
use” model makes the cloud attractive 
enterprises, where the capital expenses are
reduced. Cloud Computing is a combination of existing 
technologies that make a paradigm shift in building and 
maintaining distributed computing systems
improvements in processors, virtualization technology, 
data storage and networking have combined to make 
the cloud computing a more compelling 
cloud computing service model is “X
where X includes IT functions (e.g. infrastructure, 
storage, platform, database, software, security). 
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popular and important services delivered by the cloud 
computing model. IaaS allows customers to increase 
their available computational and storage resources 
the fly without investing in their own hardware.
IaaS is characterized by the concept of resource 
virtualization, which is a key enabler of enterprise cloud 
computing. Virtualization technology
execution of multiple operating system instances 
called virtual machines (VMs)
server. Each VM functions as if it 
the physical server with a dedicated operating 
and hosted applications. Virtualization technology 
provides the capability to achieve 
utilization rates and cut costs
collection of physical server
virtual infrastructure inside a cloud physical server is 
composed from three core components, as shown in 
Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Server Virtualization in Cloud Computing
1) Hypervisor - The hypervisor acts as the abstraction 
layer that provides the necessary
management functions 
hardware resources between the 
have two main models: hosted (para
such as Xen and Hyper
virtualization), such as
trade-off some level of isolation to increase sharing 
of resources among VMs. Typically, 
comes at the cost of performance.
2) Virtual Network - the virtual network contains the 
virtual switch (vSwitch) software that controls 
multiplexing traffic between the Virtual NICs 
(VNICs) of the installed VMs and Physical NICs 
(PNICs) of the physi
controls the inter-VM traffic on a single host that 
doesn’t touch the PNICs of the host
 Nov 2010. 
 
 
 
[3] is one of most 
on 
 
 enables the 
- 
 - on the same physical 
is the only owner of 
system 
higher hardware 
 by aggregating a 
s into one server. The 
 
 
 resource 
that enable sharing of 
VMs. Hypervisors 
-virtualization), 
-V, and non-hosted (full-
 VMware. These two models 
isolation 
 
cal host. The vSwitch also 
, and manage the 
customers trust zones. The vSwitch acts like a 
physical switch in a non-virtualized environments, 
and nearly do the same tasks, such as the core layer 
2 forwarding functions, VLAN tagging, layer 2 
checksum and segmentation. However, some 
functions like Spanning Tree Protocol are not 
needed in the vSwitch because there is no way to 
make redundant switch connections. 
3) Virtual Machines (VMs) - VMs are the software 
entities that emulate a real physical machine. VMs 
run under the control of the hypervisor that 
virtualize and multiplexes the hardware resources. 
The reset of this paper is organized as follows. Section 
2 explores the cloud virtual infrastructure security 
problems and the different threats that can affect the 
virtual infrastructure components. Section 3 reviews the 
previous work in the area of securing the virtual cloud 
infrastructure and virtualized servers. In section 4, we 
explore the key research challenges of implementing 
security solutions to protect the cloud virtual 
infrastructure. Finally, section 6 concludes the paper 
with a summary of its research contribution.   
 
II. CLOUD VIRTUAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY  
Cloud computing model provides organizations with a 
more efficient, flexible and cost effective alternative to 
own their computing resources. However, hackers and 
security researchers have shown that these capabilities 
of virtualization can be exploited to create new and 
more robust forms of malware that are hard to detect 
and can evade current security technologies [4]. 
A. Threat Model 
Security responsibility in the cloud is not a single-side 
responsibility. Security is shared between the cloud 
provider and the cloud user. Customers are not aware of 
how their VMs are being protected. On the other hand, 
the cloud providers running VMs are not aware of the 
VM contents. Thus, there is no complete trust 
relationship between cloud customers and providers. 
From a cloud provider perspective, customers’ VMs 
cannot be trusted and this will be our research focus. In 
our threat model, a hacker can be cloud user that hosts a 
service or non-cloud user, and in both models the 
victim is the cloud provider that runs the service or the 
other hosted VMs. In the former threat model, hackers 
have more chances of success, because they have access 
to the Cloud Virtual Infrastructure (VCI), and can run 
different malware to gain more access privileges. 
B.  Security Threats 
Breaching the security of any component in the VCI 
impacts significantly on the security of the other 
components and consequently affects the overall system 
security. In these papers [5-7], the authors investigated 
different vulnerabilities and security threats in cloud 
computing focusing on the VCI security threats. 
Security threats for the cloud virtual infrastructure can 
be divided into three categories: 
1) Hypervisor Attacks - Hackers consider the 
hypervisor a potential target because of the greater 
control afforded by lower layers in the system. 
Compromising the hypervisor enables gaining 
control over the installed VMs, the physical system 
and hosted applications. HyperJacking [8, 9], 
BLUEPILL [10], Vitriol [11], SubVir [12] and 
DKSM [13] are well-known attacks that target the 
virtual layer at run-time. These VM-Based Rootkits 
(VMBRs) are capable of inserting a malicious 
hypervisor on the fly or modifying the installed 
hypervisor to gain control over the host workload. 
In some hypervisors like Xen [14], the hypervisor is 
not alone in administering the VMs. A special 
privileged VM serves as an administrative interface 
to Xen, and control the other VMs. This VM is also 
a potential target for hackers target to exploit 
vulnerabilities inside that VM to gain access to the 
hypervisor or the other installed VMs. 
1) vSwitch Attacks - The vSwitch is vulnerable to a 
wide range of layer-2 attacks like a physical switch. 
These attacks include vSwitch configurations, 
VLANs and trust zones, and ARP tables [15]. 
2) Virtual Machine Attacks - Cloud servers contain 
tens of VMs, these VMs may be active or offline, 
and in both states they are vulnerable to various 
attacks. Active VMs are vulnerable to all traditional 
attacks that can affect physical servers. Once a VM 
is compromised, this gives the VMs on the same 
physical server a possibility of being able to attack 
each other, because the VMs share the same 
hardware and software resources e.g. memory, 
device drivers, storage, hypervisor software. Co-
location of multiple VMs in a single server and 
sharing the same resources, increases the attack 
surface and the risk of VM-to-VM or VM-to-
hypervisor compromise [16]. On the other hand, 
when a physical server is off, it is safe from attacks. 
However, with VMs when a VM becomes offline, it 
is still available as VM image files that are 
susceptible to malware infections and patching. 
Additionally, provisioning tools and VM templates 
are exposed to different attacks that target to create 
new unauthorized VMs, or patch the VM templates 
to infect the other VMs that will be cloned from this 
template. 
 
These new categories of security threats are a result of 
the new, complex and dynamic nature of the cloud 
virtual infrastructure, as follows: 
− Multi-Tenancy - Different users within a cloud 
share the same applications and the physical 
hardware to run their VMs. This sharing can enable 
information leakage exploitation and increases the 
attack surface and the risk of VM-to-VM or VM-to-
hypervisor compromise. 
− Workload Complexity - Server aggregation 
duplicate the amount of workload and network 
traffic that runs inside the cloud physical servers, 
which increase the complexity of managing the 
cloud workload.   
− Loss of Control - users are not aware of the 
location of their data and services and the cloud 
providers run VMs they are not aware of their 
contents.  
− Network Topology - The cloud architecture is very 
dynamic and the existing workload change over 
time, because of creating and removing VMs. In 
addition, the mobile nature of the VMs that allows 
VMs to migrate from one server to another leads to 
non-predefined network topology. 
− No Physical Endpoints - Due to server and network 
virtualization, the number of physical endpoints 
(e.g. switches, servers, NICs) is reduced. These 
physical endpoints are traditionally used in defining, 
managing and protecting IT assets. 
− Single Point of Access - virtualized servers have a 
limited number of access points (NICs) available to 
all VMs. This represents a critical security 
vulnerability where compromising these access 
points opens the door to compromise the VCI 
including VMs, hypervisor or the vSwitch. 
 
III. RELATED WORK 
The virtualization security research area was a concern 
even before the cloud computing era.  Research in this 
area can be categorized into: Traditional Security 
Solutions in the Cloud, Virtualization-Aware Security 
Solutions, Micro Hypervisors; and Hypervisor-Level 
Protection. These different problem areas are explored 
in the following sub-sections. 
A. Cloud Computing and Traditional Security 
Solutions 
This category of research focuses on how to use current 
security technologies, including firewalls, IDSs and 
IPSs, to secure the cloud virtual infrastructure. Fagui et 
al [17] use a firewall to protect the Xen hypervisor 
virtual network. This framework is based on a firewall 
hook framework called “Netfilter/Iptables” [18]. 
Sebastian et al [19] introduced a conceptual cloud-
based IDS deployment model. This model is based on 
deploying IDS sensors with each layer with a 
centralized IDS management module. Kleber et al [20] 
explored IDS as security software for the cloud by 
applying behavioral and knowledge-based analysis 
techniques to detect known and unknown attacks. Amir 
et al [21] applied agent-based IDS as a security solution 
for the cloud. Jia et al [22] introduced a framework that 
is based on the network-based IPS to install network 
filters in the cloud. Security approaches that rely on 
deploying traditional security solutions in the VMs to 
secure the CVI cloud virtual infrastructure have 
significant limitations. These approaches have a 
significant performance impact on the system as they 
generally need to trap every system call, I/O request 
and memory access before forwarding it to the 
hypervisor. They also cannot prevent attacks between 
VMs and the vSwitch because this approach does not 
leverage hypervisor-aware security capabilities. 
Moreover, these approaches are used regardless of the 
cloud complexity that results from the unlimited 
number of changes in the cloud topology, VM mobility 
and dynamic states, the huge number of the monitored 
objects and network traffic, and the inter-VM 
communications. On the other hand, as host-based 
security solutions install security agents or drivers on 
each VM to perform monitoring, these agents can be 
detected by the new-generation rootkits that have the 
ability to detect the installed security software and 
tamper with its behavior. Another important missing 
area in current research is the security of the vSwitch 
software and VLAN configurations.  
B. Virtualization-Aware Security Solutions 
This security approach deploys the security software in 
a dedicated and privileged VM (SecVM) with 
privileged access to the hypervisor to secure the other 
VMs (untrusted VMs) installed in the same physical 
server, as shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2.  SecVM and VMI Security Approach. 
 
The SecVM utilizes Virtual Machine Introspection 
(VMI) techniques, to enable monitoring and observing 
VMs from outside a VM, and get a view of the VM at 
the hypervisor level. This approach makes use of the 
isolation feature of virtualization to ensure that the 
security solution is isolated from the other server 
workload, and is also installed in a layer lower than the 
one being protected. VMI is used to monitor untrusted 
VMs from outside the VM itself without installing any 
hooks or drivers inside the untrusted VM. This 
approach makes it harder for hackers to detect the 
installed security software and the SecVM becomes 
protected from any attack target tampering with the 
security software. 
VMI and SecVM model research has gained noticeable 
attention. VMwatcher [23], VMwall [24], and others 
were developed to monitor the VM from a hypervisor 
perspective. A major drawback of the previous 
researches is the loss of semantic information. From 
outside the VM we get a VM view from a hypervisor 
perspective which includes memory-pages, disk-blocks 
and low-level instructions. In contrast when monitoring 
from inside the VM, we can view high-level entities 
like processes, registry keys, files, events, traffic and 
system calls. The difference between outside and inside 
views is called the semantic gap. X-Spy [25] is an IDS, 
which makes use of the VMI and SecVM approach to 
build a security solution that overcomes the semantic 
gap problem. Lares [26], and VMSec [27] overcome the 
semantic gap problem by taking into consideration the 
kernel version structure. 
By leveraging virtualization-aware security software, 
enterprises can enable different security technologies 
across all VMs on a protected physical server. However 
some security functions, such as handling encrypted 
traffic, accessing certain real-time information or the 
process of cleaning and removing malware from 
infected VMs will continue to require VM-based 
agents. While introspection has many applications, it is 
fundamentally limited because it only can perform 
passive monitoring [26]. Thus introspection is not 
sufficient for security applications that rely on active 
monitoring. Also, these approaches don’t consider the 
dynamic and mobile nature of VMs and cloud 
components, and only provide security for a limited 
number of VMs inside a physical host.  
 
C. Micro Hypervisors  
This category of research aims to develop new secure 
hypervisors with a specialized micro-kernel instead of 
the current large foot-print hypervisors. Micro 
hypervisors include the necessary abstractions and 
management functions in the kernel mode (Ring 0), and 
their other functions and the device drivers are 
developed in an upper layer (Ring 1 or user-mode). 
This approach helps to shrink the most critical attack 
surface in the hypervisor according to the Trusted 
Computing Base (TCB) rule [28]. Takahiro et al [29] 
and Udo et al [30]  have developed examples of micro-
hypervisor implementations. This category is out of our 
current research scope as our research is focusing on 
solutions to secure current heavy-weight hypervisors. 
D. Hypervisor-Level Protection 
This category of security research aims to secure the 
hypervisor itself against hypervisor-based rootkits and 
page-level memory attacks that arise from shared 
memory pages and software-level memory page 
translations. Ryan [31] provide memory management 
techniques and secure software-based page-level 
protection to secure the hypervisor. However, new 
generations of the AMD Opteron and Intel Xeon series 
processors have provided hardware support for memory 
virtualization by using two layers of page tables in the 
hardware-level instead on software-level translations. 
This increases the trust of the hardware and the 
hypervisor and restricts the boundaries of access that a 
VM can have. Intel and AMD virtualization technology 
hardware also provides powerful features to enhance 
trusting and protecting the operating platform, these 
features include multi-queue network, I/O memory 
management and isolation enforcements, directed I/O. 
These features help the hypervisor to be more robust 
and restrict the range of physical memory locations that 
I/O devices are able to access [32]. 
 
IV. KEY RESEARCH CHALLENGES 
The cloud virtual infrastructure is very complex and 
dynamic. In addition, the huge amount of traffic and 
workload flowing inside each physical server increases 
the complexity of the protected environment. The 
virtual architecture of the cloud erases many of the 
physical boundaries that are traditionally used in 
defining, managing and protecting organizations’ IT 
assets, leading to a very complex virtual architecture. 
Adapting security solutions in the cloud environment to 
protect cloud virtual infrastructure is a real challenge 
and requires key characteristics to be addressed in order 
to deliver the accurate and pre-emptive protection. 
These key characteristics include: 
1) Performance – Running security software 
impacts performance where the security software 
typically needs to trap e.g. system calls, I/O request and 
memory access before forwarding it to the hypervisor. 
Trapping every system activity within the huge amount 
of cloud platform activities is a major challenge. 
Moreover, providing real-time monitoring for the CVI 
including VM workload, vSwitch, and hypervisor is a 
challenging task in such complex and dynamic 
environment. On the other hand, more than just real-
time monitoring is needed. A cloud security system 
should ideally have the intelligence to be self-defending 
and be able to prevent threats, not just detect. To 
achieve that, active monitoring should be implemented; 
not passive monitoring. Active monitoring means 
installing monitors that can suspend system activities 
and events from execution until the event is being 
inspected by the security software, but in passive 
monitoring, monitors can see just the events but cannot 
interrupt these events. In passive monitoring; the 
security system cannot stop threats even if the 
monitoring is occurring in real-time.  
2) Zero-day Threats Detection – The ability to 
detect zero-day (unknown) threats is a goal for security 
experts. Security threats increase every day in number, 
complexity and creativity, so the hacker behaviour can’t 
be easily predicted. Focusing on threat behaviour may 
cause a huge number of false positives affecting the 
protected system with a range of zero-day threats. 
Instead, behavioural analysis techniques that focus on 
the protected system behaviour rather than the threat 
behaviour are a potentially effective approaches that 
enable detecting the zero-day threats with a low rate of 
false positives and negatives [33]. A good picture of 
cloud behaviour can be developed by monitoring 
different components and activates inside the cloud. 
However, maintaining real-time monitoring for the 
large number of cloud activities and components makes 
it more difficult to build a model for the ideal normal 
behaviour file of the cloud. To build an accurate 
protection system on the basis of monitoring cloud 
behaviour we must carefully select the critical objects 
in the cloud that are targets for hackers and can lead to 
useful monitoring results. 
3) Control – A major goal of hackers is control, 
by which hackers will have the ability to monitor, 
intercept, and modify system events and activities. 
Control of a system is determined by which side 
occupies the lower layers in the software stack, where 
lower layers control upper layers because lower layers 
implement the abstractions upon which upper layers 
depend. Controlling the system allows malware to 
remain invisible by obviating or disabling the security 
software. Virtualization -aware security software should 
be installed in the lowest layer of the software stack of 
the whole cloud platform, not only the software stack of 
the VM (VM’s OS is not the lowest layer in the 
virtualized environments). The security software should 
be implemented starting from the hypervisor.   
4) Defence-in-Depth – having a defence-in-depth 
approach is fundamental for providing a trustworthy 
cloud infrastructure [33, 34]. Defence-in-depth means 
defending the cloud virtual infrastructure at different 
layers with different protection mechanisms, according 
to the layer characteristics. Applying such a defence 
strategy ensures that threats should bypass by one or 
more of the defence layers. This strategy enables 
identifcation and blocking of threats at early stages 
before they propagate into the cloud workload.  
5) Virtual Appliance and JeOS –With the 
advent of virtualization, the industry is in need of a new 
software delivery system that leverages all the benefits 
of virtual infrastructures. The current approach to 
software delivery is costly and complex, especially 
when it comes to enterprise as hardware-based 
appliances. Virtual appliances offer a new paradigm for 
software delivery by packaging pre-configured, 
virtualization-ready solutions in a single software 
package that is secure, easy to distribute, and easy to 
manage [35]. A virtual appliance is a preconfigured 
software solution running on a pre-configure virtual 
machine with just enough operating system (JeOS) - 
purpose-built operating systems - that supports only the 
functions of the application. JeOS solutions occupy a 
much smaller footprint than general-purpose operating 
systems and are more stable and secure because they 
contain fewer lines of code, reducing the number of 
vulnerability exploits or configuration conflicts which 
can occur.  
6) Monitored VM – Providing an isolated, 
weakened or unprotected VM hosting mock services, 
which is carefully monitored and constrained, may 
enable detection of emerging threats by monitoring this 
VM behaviour. Hackers will detect and attempt to 
compromise this VM, revealing attack strategies that 
can be counteracted for other VMs hosting real 
application services. Such VMs should be carefully 
installed and managed, as they may become a foothold 
for attacks from within the cloud infrastructure. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
There are security challenges in the cloud, and a secure 
cloud is impossible unless the virtual environment is 
secure. Traditional security solutions do not map well to 
the virtualized environments, because of the complex 
and ever-dynamic nature of the cloud computing. New 
virtualization-aware security solutions should be 
provided to ensure the preemptive security to the 
overall system. These security solutions should have the 
intelligence to be self-defending and have the ability to 
provide real-time detection and prevention of known 
and unknown threats. 
Our research is focusing on developing a new 
virtualization-aware security solution that can meet our 
research challenges and have the ability to defend the 
cloud virtual infrastructure different layers (including 
VMs, vSwitch and Hypervisor) against zero-day 
threats.   
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